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INTRODUCTION
If econ omists agree on one thing, it is the law of demand:
if the price of a good increases, demand will decrease, all
other things held constant. This simple, but powerful
observation is at the heart of using prices to manage urban
water demands: as the price of water increases, the
demand should decrease. In short, pricing can be a useful
tool in efforts to conserve w ater. Yet studies on the price
responsiveness of water demand have produced various
results. While price elasticities of demand for water have
usually been found to be very inelastic, some studies have
suggested much more elastic demands, depending on
season or region of the county. When price is include d in
a demand model, it postulates a relationship between how
much water a consumer uses and the price they pay for
water. The econo mic question is, which price variab le
should be included in the mo del? Put another way, which
price is the one that consumers use to judge how much
water to buy?

thousand for use between 3,000 and 10,00 0 gallons, the
marginal price for a custom er using 8,00 0 gallo ns is $2.00.
However, studies have shown that people are not aware of
the marginal price of water (Nieswiadomy and Molina,
1991).

W hile many studies say marginal price should be use d in
any demand estimation when block prices exit, Foster and
Beattie (1981) believe that the perfect-knowledge
postulate implicit in marginal price models does not apply
to water. They believe that average price is the motivating
price for consum er respon se.
Foster and Beattie
concluded that, given billing procedures and the high cost
for consumers to gain and act on information about actual
water rates, the use of marginal price models does not
reflect consumer actions. Few people would gather
information necessary to apply a marginal cost decision
mod el.

Eco nom ic theory is clear that marginal price should be
used since consumers, in achieving equilibrium, eq uate
benefits with the cost at the margin (Taylor, 1975). The
marginal price is the price for another unit. Howe (1993)
states that the correct definition of price should be “... the
amount paid per unit of water withdrawn fro m the supply
system for the next (or marginal) unit withdrawn.” Howe
calls this a beh aviorally relevant measure o f the cost
incurred by the water user in using one mo re unit
(emp hasis in original). It is the cost, says Howe, that a
rational user will compare with marginal benefits in
deciding how m uch water to apply. Ho wever rational,
marginal price information is rarely available to water
customers at decision time. If a person go es to a sto re to
buy a product, the marginal price is clear. For water, what
is the marginal price and do consumers have the
information to determine the price at the margin? Usually,
the block in the rate structure where the consumer’s water
use is observed represents the marginal price (Howe,
1982). For example, in a rate structure that charges $1.50
per thousand for the first 3,000 gallons and $2.00 per

WATER PRICES
However, even the use o f average price ma y fall victim to
the same knowledge constraints as noticed by Foster and
Beattie. When a person goes to a store to buy a good, the
choice is discrete --- do they buy another unit or no t (table
1)? Consumers know the marginal price since it is the
price marked, as is the average price. The consumer can
decide to buy one, or ten or any known amount and they
make payment before use. For water, a consumer does not
buy in discre te units like gallons, but in bulk. The
consumer does not know the marginal price for every use
of water or the amount used at any one time. Finally,
water bills com e after use . Consumers cannot adjust the
quantity demanded at discrete block boundaries. Knowing
consumption during the billing period is difficult since a
consumer cannot easily check the meter.
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Table 1. W ater vs. Other Goods Price Decisions
Other goods
Discrete choice
Known marginal price
Known average price
Known amount purchased
Pay before use

W ater
Bulk Buying
Do not know marginal price
Do not know average price
Do not know amount p urchased at time of use
Pay after use

Further, water bills often do not carry information needed
to make decisions. They also often convey so much
unrelated information tha t sorting it out is difficult. In a
survey in Tulsa a lack of rate structure knowledge was
evident (Agthe , et al, 1988). Only 21 percent of those
surveyed were aware that there was a block rate structure
at all. To get inform ation o n blocks, co nsumers had to
contact the utility. It was found that the complexity of the
structure confused customers and prevented information
acquisition.

were asked to check the rate structure currently used.
Later in the survey, they were asked to show the exact rate
structures using prices per thousand. When the two
answers were cross-checked, 48 percent of the managers
misidentified the rate structure in use.

Often, the comp lexity of the bill itself is a hindrance to
information collection. Figure 1 shows an actual water bill
for a local utility. This utility shows water charges along
with wastewater, storm water, electric, garbage disposal
and collection and other charges. The bill arrived March
3 and showed the recipient of this bill that water
consumption for January 1999 was 43 gallons, with
average consumption 1.483 gallons. What is a consumer
to think about these figures? Did they consume 43
gallons, or 4,300 gallons as the bill is supposed to convey?
W hat is the marginal price charged for the last unit
consumed? On the other end of the spectrum, Figure 2
shows a water utility bill with little information. H ere, it
is shown that 7,700 gallons were consumed but
information o n rates, structures, o r charges is lack ing.

In a 1992 survey in Georgia, 400 p eop le were asked if
they knew how m uch they paid for water in an average
month. Of those, 62 percent knew their water bill and
provided an answer that, when checked, approximated
their true water bills. Another 26 percent did not know
their bills because they included it in rent. Only 12
percent had no idea of their water bill. W hen the same
peo ple were asked if they knew their water rate or rate
structure, only twelve people answered yes and of those,
eight were wro ng.
It is not only water customers that are confused about
rates. In a 19 95 su rvey, water utility managers in G eorgia

Figure 1. Exam ple of a Local W ater Utility Bill - 1
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Figure 2. Exam ple of Local W ater Utility Bill - 2

W hile what works in models does affect eco nom ic
research, consumers clearly do not make water decisions
based on marginal price, average price or some price
differential. The only informatio n consumers have is their
total water b ill, usually lagged one month. Of course,
when looking at the b ill in figure 1, how do consumers
react to the “total bill?” Is it the price of water only, water
plus wastewater, or all utilities? In a recent survey of 89
water utilities across the US on experiences using
conservation water rates (Albani and Jo rdan, 19 99) almost
all of the respondents charge for water and wastewater on
the same bill and nearly half have some type of garbage
collection charge. Gas charges were included on the bills
of 8 percent of the utility respondents, along with electric
(12 percent), cable (2 percent), storm water (31 percent),
and other (20 percent). With deregulation of gas d elivery,
more local governments will be including that charge
along with new telecommunication charges.
Bill
consolidation is presenting customers with larger single
bills with water only one item. If, as is believed,
customers respo nd more to the total amou nt of the b ill
rather than any one item, the use o f water pricing alo ne to
provide conservation incentives may become less
effective. While bill consolidation is a savings to local
governmen ts, the sacrifice may be in the ability to use
pricing for any one utility item to send conservation
incentives. Further, while nearly two-thirds of the
surveyed utilities used monthly billing (79 percent nonresidential), non-monthly billing is still significant. Again,
to use water bills to se nd co nserva tion-incentive signals

requires timely information to the consumer. It is
interesting that as more utilities seem to be using price as
an incentive for conservation, the changes in bill practices
may make such use less effective.

PEAK AND SEASONAL PRICING
W hile it is uncertain what p rices co nsumers resp ond to,
and whethe r they resp ond to specific rate structures, there
is evidence that peak pricing does give a clear eco nom ic
signal and can p roduce the desired consequ ences.
Lyman (1992) found peak perio d price elasticity was more
than twice the off-peak elasticity. Lyman estimated peak
elasticity of about -1.3 5 compa red with an inelastic offpeak elasticity of -0.44. Thus, peak prices are more elastic
than nonp eak. Lyman also found cross-price effects
between peak and off-peak periods. This effect was
similar to an income effect where peak charges affect
water use in the nonpeak period. For example, peak
charges could cause people to buy water efficient du rable
goods like dishwashers or washing machines that cut offpeak water use. W ith all else constant, Lyman found that
the long-run effect of a variable influencing dem and will
be 24.5 percent greater in the peak vs. off-peak period.
Lyman concluded that although the literature on
conservation pricing focuses on block price schemes,
utilities may find it better to consider peak and off-peak
effects.
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Seasonal pricing, a form of peak pricing, is also an
effective method of using marginal cost to price water.
Griffin and Chang (1991) found that summer residential
demand is more price respo nsive than winter demand.
Consequently, price can be a more effective allocative tool
in the summer than winter. Summer price sensitivity can
be as great as 30 percent more than winter price responses.
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However the price signal is sent, perhaps as long as
increased water use produces higher water bills, the use of
pricing as a conservation measure is useful. So, wh ile
price matters, it may be that rate structures do not,
particularly for residential water use.
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